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severely menaced. Whiting thus concluded
PRC and the United States? More than forty
that Beijing’s management of the Korean
years after the end of the Korean War,
crisis was based primarily on the Chinese
scholarly answers to these questions are still
Communist perception of America’s threat
limited and remarkably inadequate.
to China’s national security. Lacking access
In the 1950s, Western scholars, strongly
to Chinese archival materials, though,
influenced by the intensifying Cold War,
Whiting’s study had to focus more on the
generally viewed China’s entrance into the
analysis of the environment in which the
Korean War as a reflection of a well-coordi-
Beijing leadership made their decision to go
nated Communist plot of worldwide expan-
to war than on a close examination of the
sion, believing that the entire international
decision-making process.
Communist movement was under the con-
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a more
trol of Moscow, and that neither Beijing nor
critical perspective on the Sino-American
Pyongyang had the freedom to make their
confrontation in Korea emerged in the wake
own foreign policy decisions. The Korean
of the American debacle in Vietnam, the
normalization of Sino-American relations,
and the declassification of new archival docu-
mentation. Building on Whiting’s thesis,
scholars paid more attention to Chinese Com-
munist Party (CCP) leaders’ concerns for
China’s national security as the decisive
factor underlying their decision to enter the
Korean War. They generally argued that
Beijing did not welcome the Korean War
because China faced difficult tasks of eco-
nomic reconstruction and political consoli-
dation at home and gave priority to liberat-
ing Nationalist-controlled Taiwan. Many of
these scholars stressed that Beijing’s deci-
sion to enter the Korean War was simply a
reluctant reaction to the imminent threats to
the physical security of Chinese territory.
And while most scholars believed that the
American decision to cross the 38th parallel
triggered China’s intervention, some specu-
lated that if UN forces had stopped at the
parallel China would not have intervened.4
A large majority of Chinese scholars seem to
share these assumptions, as can be seen in
Chinese publications on the “War to Resist
America and Assist Korea” that appeared in
the 1980s.5
As a lecturer at Shanghai’s East China
Normal University in the early 1980s and
then during my pursuit of doctoral studies in
the United States, I became increasingly
interested in the emergence of Sino-Ameri-
can confrontation in the late 1940s and early
1950s. In my study I too believed in the
standard interpretation of China’s reasons
for entering the Korean War. Not until
1988-1990, when the work on my disserta-
tion led me to fresh Chinese sources, did I
begin to feel doubts. For example, to my
surprise, I found that early in August 1950,
more than one month before the Inchon
landing, Mao Zedong and the Beijing lead-
ership had been inclined to send troops to
Korea, and China’s military and political
preparations had begun even a month ear-
lier. I also found that the concerns behind
the decision to enter the Korean War went
far beyond the defense of the safety of the
Chinese-Korean border. Mao and his asso-
ciates aimed to win a glorious victory by
driving the Americans off the Korean penin-
sula. It was no longer possible to accept the
well-established view of Chinese and Ameri-
can historians.
continued on page 85
FYN-SI [Stalin].
No. 362/sh
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov
1.7.50
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346,
List 104 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a,
Delo 3, Papka 11, l. 107]
16. 1 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov
to Fyn-Si (Stalin) re political mood on
North Korea
Ciphered telegram No. 405809
From Pyongyang.Sent 2.7.50 04.00.
Received 2.7.50 05.47.
Sent to the 8th Administration of the General
Staff of the Armed Forces. 2.7.50 05.55
By wire.
Extremely Urgent.
To Comrade FYN SI [Stalin]
To No. 362.
I report about the political mood of the
northerners in connection with the interven-
tion of the Americans.
With the beginning of the successful
military operations of the People’s Army,
and especially after the liberation of the city
of Seoul, the mood of the population was
characterized by great general political en-
thusiasm.
The population of the liberated regions
in the main greeted the People’s Army warmly
and in every way cooperated with the mea-
sures it took. Organs of power are being
created everywhere—people’s committees,
social-political organizations, they have re-
stored production and trade. At this time
even the reactionary elements did not take
action against the measures of the govern-
ment of the DPRK and the People’s Army.
The successful attack of the People’s
Army activated the partisans, at present the
partisan movement is developing widely in
the rear of the South Korean army.
However, in connection with the wide-
spread American propaganda over the radio,
which is directed against the DPRK, and the
frequent attacks by American planes on popu-
lation points, industrial and military sites in
North and South Korea, the political mood of
the population is somewhat worsening.
Individual attitudes of lack of belief in
the final victory have appeared, and in the
liberated regions a certain (small) portion of
the population is taking a wait and see posi-
tion.
42 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN
The leadership of the DPRK and the
People’s Army (Kim Il Sung, Pak Hon-Yong,
Pak Il U, Kim Bek, Tsoi En Gen, Kan Gen)
correctly evaluate the complicated military-
political situation in Korea, believe in full
victory and are directing all efforts toward a
subsequent broad attack on the south of Ko-
rea.
KIM IL SUNG and PAK HON-YONG
understand the difficulties for Korea elicited
by the entrance of the Americans into the war
against the DPRK and in connection with
this they are taking the necessary measures to
stabilize human and material resources for
the war.
KIM IL SUNG asked my opinion about
forming additional infantry, tank, and naval
units and formations. They intend to intro-
duce universal military service in the DPRK.
However, some portion of the leading
figures, including KIM TU-BONG, KHON
MEN KHI are speaking about the difficulties
of conducting a war against the Americans
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