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pretend to and boast of; for the conditions specified are realized in them.
Ironical people, on the other hand, with their depreciatory way of speaking of
themselves, seem to be of a more refined character; for their motive in speaking thus
seems to be not love of gain, but desire to avoid parade: but what they disclaim seems
also* to be especially that which men esteem of which Socrates was an instance.
But those who disclaim petty advantages which they evidently possess are called
affected (²±Åº¿À±½¿[Editor: illegible character]Á³¿¹), and are more easily held in
contempt. And sometimes this self-depreciation is scarcely distinguishable from
boasting, as for instance dressing like a Spartan; for there is something boastful in
extreme depreciation as well as in exaggeration.
But those who employ irony in moderation, and speak ironically in matters that are
not too obvious and palpable, appear to be men of refinement.
Finally, the boaster seems to be especially the opposite of the truthful man; for he is
worse than the ironical man.
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8.
Of Wittiness.
Again, since relaxation is an element in our life, and one mode of relaxation is
amusing conversation, it seems that in this respect also there is a proper way of
mixing with others; i.e. that there are things that it is right to say, and a right way of
saying them: and the same with hearing; though here also it will make a difference
what kind of people they are in whose presence you are speaking, or to whom you are
listening.
And it is plain that it is possible in these matters also to go beyond, or to fall short of,
the mean.
Now, those who go to excess in ridicule seem to be buffoons and vulgar fellows,
striving at all costs for a ridiculous effect, and bent rather on raising a laugh than on
making their witticisms elegant and inoffensive to the subject of them. While those
who will never say anything laughable themselves, and frown on those who do, are
considered boorish and morose. But those who jest gracefully are called witty, or men
of ready wit (µ?ÄÁ¬Àµ»¿¹), as it were ready or versatile men.
For* a man s character seems to reveal itself in these sallies or playful movements,
and so we judge of his moral constitution by them, as we judge of his body by its
movements.
But through the prominence given to ridiculous things, and the excessive delight
which most people take in amusement and jesting, the buffoon is often called witty
because he gives delight. But that there is a difference, and a considerable difference,
between the two is plain from what we have said.
An element in the character that observes the mean in these matters is tact. A man of
tact will only say and listen to such things as it befits an honest man and a gentleman
to say and listen to; for there are things that it is quite becoming for such a man to say
and to listen to in the way of jest, and the jesting of a gentleman differs from that of a
man of slavish nature, and the jesting of an educated from that of an uneducated man.
This one may see by the difference between the old comedy and the new: the fun of
the earlier writers is obscenity, of the later innuendo; and there is no slight difference
between the two as regards decency.
Can good jesting, then, be defined as making jests that befit a gentleman, or that do
not pain the hearer, or that even give him pleasure? Nay, surely a jest that gives
pleasure to the hearer is something quite indefinite, for different things are hateful and
pleasant to different people.
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But the things that he will listen to will be of the same sort [as those that he will say,
whatever that be]: jests that a man can listen to he can, we think, make himself.
So then there are jests that he will not make [though we cannot exactly define them];
for to make a jest of a man is to vilify him in a way, and the law forbids certain kinds
of vilification, and ought perhaps also to forbid certain kinds of jesting.
The refined and gentlemanly man, therefore, will thus regulate his wit, being as it
were a law to himself.
This then is the character of him who observes the mean, whether we call him a man
of tact or a man of ready wit.
The buffoon, on the other hand, cannot resist an opportunity for a joke, and, if he can
but raise a laugh, will spare neither himself nor others, and will say things which no
man of refinement would say, and some of which he would not even listen to.
The boor, lastly, is wholly useless for this kind of intercourse; he contributes nothing,
and takes everything in ill part. And yet recreation and amusement seem to be
necessary ingredients in our life.
In conclusion, then, the modes just described of observing the mean in social life are
three in number,* and all have to do with conversation or joint action of some kind:
but they differ in that one has to do with truth, while the other two are concerned with
what is pleasant; and of the two that are concerned with pleasure, one finds its field in
our amusements, the other in all other kinds of social intercourse.
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9.
Of The Feeling Of Shame
Shame (±?´ÎÂ) cannot properly be spoken of as a virtue; for it is more like a feeling
or emotion than a habit or trained faculty. At least, it is defined as a kind of fear of
disgrace, and its effects are analogous to those of the fear that is excited by danger;
for men blush when they are ashamed, while the fear of death makes them pale. Both
then seem to be in a way physical, which is held to be a mark of a feeling or emotion,
rather than of a habit or trained faculty.
Again, it is a feeling which is not becoming at all times of life, but only in youth; it is
thought proper for young people to be ready to feel shame, because, as their conduct
is guided by their emotions, they often are misled, but are restrained from wrong
actions by shame.
And so we praise young men when they are ready to feel shame, but no one would
praise a man of more advanced years for being apt to be ashamed; for we consider
that he ought not to do anything which could make him ashamed of himself.
Indeed, shame is not the part of a good man, since it is occasioned by vile acts (for
such acts should not be done: nor does it matter that some acts are really shameful,
others shameful in public estimation only; for neither ought to be done, and so a man
ought not to be ashamed); it is the part of a worthless man and the result* of being
such as to do something shameful.
But supposing a man s character to be such that, if he were to do one of these
shameful acts, he would be ashamed, it is absurd for him to fancy that he is a good
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